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Sixteenth Century Journal 
VIII, 1 (April 1977) 
The Development of the 
Lutheran Theory of Resistance: 1523-1530 
Cynthia Grant Shoenberger* 
Illinois Institute of Technology 
IT IS FREQUENTLY assumed, especially by political theorists, that the devel- 
opment of the modern theory of resistance to governmental authority was the 
accomplishment primarily of Huguenot writers of the late sixteenth century 
and that it was they who laid the foundations for the more famous seven- 
teenth-century English theories of a right of revolution. The corollary is that 
Lutheran writers made little contribution to the development of this theory, if 
not, indeed, a negative one. Contrary to this fairly common assumption, how- 
ever, the justification of resistance was 'a major concern of German Protestants 
in the early sixteenth century, and I would contend that they played an 
indispensable role in developing and transmitting the inchoate theories of the 
Middle Ages to the Calvinists of the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
who made of them a doctrine which could properly be termed a theory of the 
right of revolution. 
Before proceeding to support this contention, it is important to delin- 
eate what I mean by a "mature" theory of resistance, especially since I intend 
repeatedly to use certain theoretical assumptions in my analysis of the early 
Lutheran writings. A resistance theory, properly so called, must go beyond the 
description or vindication of any one instance of refusal to obey and provide 
for its audience a justification which is capable of being generalized to cases 
other than the one at hand. This is essentially what we mean by the very 
word "theory." Moreover, a "mature" or "complete" theory of political resist- 
ance will provide answers to the following five questions: 
1. May men ever justly resist established political authority? 
2. If so, when may they resist? 
3. By whom shall action be taken? 
4. How is such resistance to be carried out? 
5. If the resistance is successful, are the victors then free to reorganize 
the society after a new image? 
These five concerns make up the components of a fully-developed theory of 
resistance and can be summarized as the questions of the justification, stan- 
dards, agents, methods, and outcome of resistance. These were not questions 
*Prepared for the Sixteenth Century Studies Conference, October 31, 1975, at 
Iowa City, Iowa. 
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which the early Protestant writers approached de novo, for resistance had 
been a concern of many during the Middle Ages as well; and it is essential in 
order to assess the Lutheran contribution to summarize briefly the extent to 
which a resistance theory had evolved by the first years of the sixteenth 
century, as well as the extent to which such theory formed a viable basis 
upon which the Protestants could build. 
The Medieval Heritage 
Question number one, whether men may ever justly resist established 
authority, was, after an initial period of reluctance based on the patristic 
interpretation of Paul's injunctions in Romans 13, answered in the affirmative. 
The idea that resistance was at times justified was generally accepted in both 
secular and theological writings, although it occasionally co-existed uneasily 
with the rest of an author's political thought. The tendency was to assume 
that resistance was permitted without exploring the implications for political 
obligation, either because the writers saw political obligation as something so 
natural that it hardly needed to be explained, or because they saw it as 
something so exceptional that resistance was not to be regarded as unusual. 
Question number two, regarding when such resistance might justly be 
engaged in, was most frequently met with a repetition of the ancient tyrant- 
just king distinction. The standards for tyranny were by and large left very 
vague. When specified at all, such as by the civil lawyers, or when we can 
infer from the actions of medieval rebels what they considered the limits of 
their obedience to be, the standards offered revolved, with varying emphases, 
around a three-fold requirement: that the king maintain adequate standards of 
public order; that he, both by his own behavior and by his use of public 
power, support and protect the Christian church; and that he observe cus- 
tomary law, the clauses of which were not spelled out. 
A variety of possibilities were offered in answer to question three, the 
issue of who was to apply the standards of judgment and carry out the 
resistance. The notion that a private individual might rid the community of a 
tyrannical monarch simply by assassinating him was offered by tyrannicide 
theorists such as John of Salisbury and, in turn, rejected by Aquinas, Marsilius 
of Padua, and the conciliarists, all of whom favored forms of deposition 
resting upon community action. Moreover, the idea that the pope might in 
effect depose rulers through excommunication was current among parties 
whose political thought rested upon the notion of a universal Christian order 
embracing both the secular and spiritual spheres. In actual medieval practice, 
however, whoever was able to resist the ruler effectively did so, and fine 
distinctions were disregarded in favor of "self-help." This practice did rest 
upon a vague belief that "the people" might overturn their own rulers and 
that the people were in some sense represented by their natural leaders. From 
this somewhat democratic view, as well as in reaction to fears about the 
consequences of either private or papal resistance, opinion converged upon the 
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necessity for public bodies to carry out such measures. It was upon this 
answer that there was the most agreement, and yet it was this answer which 
was least capable of being put into effect until and where such representative 
institutions actually existed. 
The medieval answer to question number four, how resistance was to be 
carried out, was perhaps the most vague. At various times it was suggested 
that the proper response was to kill, depose, excommunicate, or banish the 
ruler - or to impose varying combinations thereof. In practice, armed warfare 
and whatever measures seemed most expedient were the rule. As to what 
might happen in the case of successful resistance (i.e., question number five), I 
think it is fair to say that with the exception of Marsilius and possibly of the 
conciliarists, who said relatively little about secular tyranny, medieval theorists 
of resistance envisaged a reversion to the status quo ante. The right of resist- 
ance was regarded as a great exception, and it did not extend to a reorganiza- 
tion of the political and social structure. Even those theorists who implied 
that the people were ultimately sovereign did not, with the exception of 
Marsilius, base any more than an infrequent right of resistance upon this 
ultimate authority; the resistance represented an extraordinary entry into the 
political process and was not followed by any continuing participation.1 
How useful were the theories evolved by medieval thinkers to the 
writers who followed them? No sophisticated theoretical basis for resistance 
had been developed, and hence later writers had to face the whole problem of 
justification anew. The standards for when resistance might be undertaken 
were left extremely general, yet because of this very non-specificity it was 
possible for sixteenth-century writers to build upon and to develop them with 
material relevant to the new political and religious structures. Question three 
received the most attention in the Middle Ages; the whole issue of private 
versus public forms of resistance was debated in a manner which could not 
have helped but influence later writers. Several of the conclusions reached by 
medieval writers, however, such as that a private individual or the pope 
might take action, were obviously not consonant with Reformation social 
theory; on the other hand, with the emergence of "representative" institutions 
by the early sixteenth century, the implementation of public forms of resist- 
ance at last became possible. Protestant writers approached questions four and 
five on their own and displayed their own level of sophistication by dealing 
with these key issues at length and independently. 
1 For good general surveys on the medieval heritage the reader is directed to R. W. 
and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West (6 vols.; New York: 
Barnes and Noble, 1903); Fritz Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, trans. S. B. 
Chrimes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948); Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and 
Politics in the Late Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1961); Otto Gierke, Political 
Theories of the Middle Age, trans. F. W. Maitland (Cambridge: The University Press, 
1951). 
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Martin Luther 
I have chosen to analyse the Protestants' efforts along these lines in the 
years from 1523 to 1530 precisely because it was during this period that 
Martin Luther himself staunchly opposed resistance of any kind. Again and 
again, under pressure from his own elector and from politicians such as Philip 
of Hesse, he repeated his conviction that a Christian could not in good con- 
science support resistance to his secular overlord, the emperor.2 The first 
evidence that his opinion on this question was not unalterable appeared in his 
signature of the Wittenberg theologians' brief at the Torgau Disputation during 
October and November of 1530, in which they concluded that ". . . when we 
previously taught positively never to resist the established authority, we did 
not know that such a right was granted by the laws of that very authority 
which we have at all times diligently instructed people to obey."3 Although 
his acquiescence in 1530 was somewhat reluctant, the evidence of Luther's 
private correspondence and "Table Talk" after the conclusion of the Schmal- 
kaldic League- and during the years from 1530 to his death in 1546 suggests 
that he came increasingly to support the notion of resistance to the emperor, 
first on strictly constitutional grounds but ultimately on the basis of natural 
law as well. 
Because of his vast moral authority this change in Luther's attitude was 
a great boon to the Evangelical princes intent upon resisting the emperor's 
desire to re-establish religious unity in Germany, and Luther's approval en- 
couraged other Protestant theologians to write extensively and openly about 
the subject as well. Nonetheless, the development of Luther's view of resist- 
ance clearly postdated the elaboration of most of the key elements of what 
was to become the "classic" Lutheran doctrine of resistance and is thus of 
somewhat secondary importance for students of intellectual history. For 
Luther's own opinion was heavily influenced (some scholars4 would even say 
2See, for example, Ein Brief an die Fursten zu Sachsen von dem aufruhrischen 
Geist (1524), in D. Martin Luthers Werke (hereafter WA [Weimar Ausgabel), (Weimar: 
Herman Bohlau, 1883-1948), XV, 210-221; Ermahnung zum Frieden auf die zwolf 
Artikel der Bauernschaft in Schwaben (1525), WA, XVIII, 291-334; Wider die rauberi- 
schen und morderischen Rotten der Bauern (1525), WA, XVIII, 357-61; Luther to the 
Danzig Council (May 5, 1525), in WA Briefe III, 483-86; Ob Kriegsleute auch in seligem 
Stande sein konnen (1526), WA, XIX, 623-62; to Chancellor Bruck (March 28, 1528), 
WA Briefe, IV, 421-24; Luther to Elector Johann (March 6, 1530)%, WA Briefe, V, 
25 8-6 1. 
3"Erkarung Luthers, Jonas', Melanchthons, Spalatins und anderer Theologen und 
protokollarische Aufzeichnung uiber die weitern Voten der Theologen und Juristen" 
(October 26-28, 1530), in Heinz Scheible ed., Das Widerstandsrecht als Problem der 
deutschen Protestanten, 1523-1546, Vol. X of Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiege- 
schichte, ed. Gerhard Ruhbach (GUtersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1969), p. 67. Translation mine. 
4See, for example, Karl Muller, Luthers Ausserungen uber das Recht der bewaffne- 
ten Widerstands gegen den Kaiser, in Sitzungsberichte der koniglichen bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenchaften, phil. - hist. Klasse, VIII (Munich, 1915), 43-45, 52ff. and 
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"coerced") by the princes upon whom his church relied and to whom he was 
resolutely loyal after the Protestant alliance came into existence. In any case, 
his notions were quite clearly derived from their previous elaboration by 
Evangelical princes, jurists attached to their courts, and by Luther's own close 
theological colleagues. Thus I intend to concentrate my discussion on how 
arguments for resistance to the emperor, arguments based both on constitu- 
tional and on natural law, were in fact developed during this very early period 
by Protestant theologians, lawyers, and politicians. 
The Development of Natural Law Arguments for Resistance 
Luther did more, however, than merely ratify theories worked out by 
close associates, for he provided the other Protestants with many blocks from 
which to construct their theories, such as the notion of the "Two Kingdoms" 
and the belief that all magistrates were charged by God with the protection of 
their subjects;5 and some of his colleagues were quick to make use of them. 
For example, when Frederick of Saxony in 1523 asked Luther and several 
other theologians whether he would be justified in forcibly protecting his 
Protestant subjects against the emperor,6 Luther's own answer was negative; 
but Johannes Bugenhagen contributed a separate brief disagreeing with this 
position. Bugenhagen acknowledged that individual Christians were obliged to 
suffer passively, but their princes were also required to protect them against 
injustice, just as they were required to protect them against robbery or 
murder. As servants of the law, possessors of the sword, and protectors of 
their people, they therefore had the right, he concluded, to resist the em- 
peror.7 After the so-called "Pack Affair" of 1528 and the second Diet of 
Speyer in 1529,8 Bugenhagen developed this opinion into a lengthy brief to 
the Elector John. His argument was built around the two fundamental 
Lutheran concepts referred to above, the notion of spheres of secular and 
spiritual authority and the duty of the prince or magistrate to protect his 
subjects. The emperor's authority, he declared, was legitimate only within a 
limited sphere. If he attempted to act in matters which rightfully fell within 
God's sphere instead, that is, in matters of religion, the emperor was to be not 
Pierre Mesnard, L'Essor de la Philosophie Politique au XVIe Siecle (Paris: Boivin, 1936), 
p. 228, both of whom feel that this opinion contradicts Luther's whole philosophy and 
that he had merely given in to the princes. 
' Luther, Von weltlicher Oberkeit: wie weit man ihr gehorsam schuldig sei (1523), 
WA, IX, 245-80. 
6 Luther, Gutachten (for Elector Frederick of Saxony, shortly before Feb. 8, 1523), 
in Scheible, p. 17. 
7Bugenhagen, in Scheible, p. 28. 
8 The "Pack Affair" involved a rumor that a Catholic league was preparing to 
attack Protestant strongholds; at the 1529 Diet of Speyer, the emperor withdrew all past 
concessions to the Lutherans. 
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only disobeyed but also actively resisted by the princes. These rulers, although 
formally the emperor's inferiors, were nonetheless obligated to protect their 
subjects; for God had conveyed the use of the sword to them for that pur- 
pose. Such an obligation did not cease if the superior magistrate himself failed 
to fulfill his own duties in this respect.9 
Such an argument bore some similarity to late medieval doctrines that 
the German electors shared with the emperor a responsibility for the empire 
and that their obligations to it continued even if he were derelict. In fact, 
however, Bugenhagen's notion was quite different in that he derived the 
princes' continuing responsibility not from any unique constitutional position 
but from their divine vocation. German law had less to do with the require- 
ments of their role than did the law of God. 
The same was true of the general standards which Bugenhagen delin- 
eated for the determination of when the emperor was to be resisted, that is, 
when he attacked the Protestants because of their faith, a matter over which 
"Caesar" had no jurisdiction. The only specifically legal ground for resistance 
mentioned in his treatise was the emperor's obligation to give the Protestants' 
case a hearing before condemning them.1 0 This right did indeed have a basis 
in German law, in the "electoral capitulations" which Charles V had accepted 
upon acceding to the imperial throne in 1519 and which included a promise 
not to condemn any German unheard, as well as in the whole issue of the 
appeals which were pending. Bugenhagen, however, unlike other writers at this 
time and perhaps more realistically considering what the result of an imperial 
or conciliar "hearing" was likely to be, did not pursue the question of legal 
rights in his justification of resistance. He instead voiced this right to a hearing 
as though it were a general, indeed, a natural right and inserted it into his 
argument almost peripherally as a "special reason for resistance" which had 
already been justified upon other grounds. Thus, in addressing the questions 
of what I have called the justification, standards, and agents of resistance, 
Bugenhagen was interested in what the law of God had to say about the 
matter, not in what the law of man said. 
Likewise, when he turned to question number four, that of how any 
such resistance was to be carried out, Bugenhagen drew his recommendations 
from Luther's own description of the divinely-established role of the prince 
and of the Christian's duty to make use of the power of the state only out of 
concern for his brothers and never in self-interest.1 1 If a magistrate were also 
a Christian, therefore, he would never undertake any resistance to the emperor 
9Bugenhagen, "Bedencken, auff die Frage: ob man das Evangelium wider den 
Keyser, mit dem Schwerdt schUtzen mdge?" (to Elector John of Saxony, 1529), in Fried- 
rich Hortleder, Handlungen und Ausschreiben... Von Rechtmdssigkeit, Anfang, Fort- 
und endlichen Ausgang des Teutschen Kriegs Keyser Karls dess ffinfften (2nd ed.; Gotha: 
Wolfgang Endters, 1645), II, 64. 
1 0Ibid., p. 65. 
" Luther, Von weltlicher Oberkeit, WA, XI, 245-80. 
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on his own behalf. The individual prince should endure his superior's attack 
without meeting it with force as long as the matter affected only the prince's 
own welfare; if that of his subjects were involved, on the other hand, he was 
obliged to defend them. In such a case he was directed first to intercede with 
his superior, then to publicize the affair, and finally, if all else failed to effect 
a just resolution, to resist forcibly.12 Bugenhagen clearly saw the purpose of 
such resistance as the coercion of the emperor into changing his course of 
action, but he envisaged no permanent rearrangement of authority relations in 
the empire. He accepted the fact that the emperor was indeed the princes' 
hierarchical superior and that superiors must be obeyed, but under certain 
exceptional circumstances the princes might nonetheless resist him. 
Bugenhagen, it is true, presented these conclusions to the elector as still 
being somewhat tentative, and he expressed the desire that they remain 
secret. 3Nonetheless, such notions were beginning to make themselves felt 
upon policy. An opinion written to guide the Saxon delegates to the 
Schwabach discussions in October of 1529 echoed Bugenhagen's sentiments. 
In it the Saxon theologians, assisted by the elector's lawyers, defended resist- 
ance by the princes to the emperor in the case of an attack upon the Protes- 
tants for their faith on the grounds that spiritual matters were strictly ex- 
cluded from the emperor's jurisdiction and that the princes had a duty to 
protect their subjects. 1 4 This opinion thus essentially summarized and re- 
peated the natural law arguments for resistance which Bugenhagen had been 
making since 1523. 
Constitutional and Juridical Arguments for Resistance 
At the same time, and ultimately more important in convincing Luther 
at Torgau, Protestant writers were constructing elaborate legal arguments in 
support of resistance to the emperor. The Saxon jurists handed their prince an 
opinion in January of 1530 concluding that such resistance was indeed jus- 
tified because Charles was a constitutionally limited monarch.1 5 Such argu- 
ments were related to the late medieval conviction that the empire was really 
more of an aristocracy than an absolute monarchy, the electors being co-rulers 
with the emperor, with their responsibility including the duty to correct and/ 
or depose him under certain circumstances. Arguments based upon the role of 
the electors, however, could not be used to justify resistance by authorities 
who did not belong to the electoral college under the terms of the Golden 
1 2 Bugenhagen, "Bedencken," in Hortleder, II, 64-65. 
1 3Ibid., p. 65. 
1 4Hans von Schubert, Bekenntnisbildung und Religionspolitik. 1529/30 
(1524-1534) (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1910), pp. 185-87. 
' ' Gutachten der kursdchsischen Juristen, in Scheible, pp. 63-66. 
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Bull; yet the tendency was to identify all the estates with the electors in this 
right. Even such an assimilation did not apply to the case of the imperial 
cities, though, since their constitutional position was quite different from that 
of the territorial states. They were directly responsible to the emperor, and 
their economic and political interests, as Hans Baron has pointed out, dictated 
a close allegiance to him. 16 Nonetheless, several of these cities were staunchly 
evangelical, Strasbourg, Nuremberg, and Bremen being the most prominent 
among them. When their leaders entered into the alliance discussions of this 
period, some new theory was clearly required to justify resistance on their 
part. 
Such a theory emerged from the notion of the "inferior magistrates," 7 
which was best articulated by Martin Bucer of Strasbourg. Bucer pointed to 
the fact that in Romans 13, St. Paul had spoken not of the "power" but of 
the "powers" that be. The obvious conclusion, Bucer thought, was that God 
had ordained, as a general rule, systems of multiple authorities; thus it was 
that in Germany power had been conveyed to numerous authorities, as well as 
to the emperor.18 There were many individuals and institutions, Bucer went 
on to explain in a later (1535) treatise, who possessed the authority to make 
laws within their respective territories and to inflict capital punishment upon 
their subjects without obtaining the consent of the emperor; as examples he 
cited the estates, princes, margraves, cities, and many of the nobles.1 9 Even 
though the office of these "inferior magistrates" was received directly from 
the emperor, Bucer thought he was acting merely as God's agent in trans- 
mitting the sword to them.20 Moreover, once it had been granted, the lesser 
magistrates' power was not limited by the emperor; they were, in fact, each 
like emperors in their own territories. Bucer's image of the German constitu- 
tion thus reduced the empire to little more than a loose confederation. 
Philip of Hesse, the man most actively involved in the negotiations for a 
Protestant League, however, was unwilling to sacrifice the theoretical unity of 
Germany. In his repeated attempts to gain the allegiance of Nuremberg to his 
' 6Hans Baron, in "Religion and Politics in the German Imperial Cities during the 
Reformation," English Historical Review, LII (1937), 406-413, discusses at length how 
the cities were tied to the emperor by the facts that their commercial interest demanded 
a strong and large political unit and that they were discriminated against in favor of the 
estates in the imperial diet. 
7The best discussion of the theory of the inferior magistrates is to be found in 
Richard Roy Benert's "Inferior Magistrates in Sixteenth-Century Political and Legal 
Thought" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Minne- 
sota, 1964). 1 am greatly indebted to him for directing my attention to many critical 
sources. 
1 8 Bucer, Enarrationes perpetuae, in sacra quatuor evangelia (Strasbourg, 1530), pp. 
57-58. 
1 9 Bucer, Dialogi oder Gesprech von der gemainsame (Augsburg, 1535), no. 9, 
p. Viii. 
2 0Ibid., p. Xiii v. 
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project he outlined instead a notion of the empire as a limited monarchy. He 
wrote, for example, that the relationship between the emperor and the in- 
ferior magistrates was a conditional one; if the emperor departed from his 
duty to abide by the terms of his election and according to standards of 
justice in dealing with the princes and cities, then the fundamental reason for 
which he had been elected, the maintenance of the laws, would vanish, and 
with it his authority. The obligation of the inferior magistrates to protect 
their subjects would remain, nonetheless; they were bound to exercise it 
against a tyrannical emperor just as they would against the violent attack of 
the Turks.2 1 
Philip's version of the German constitution was contradicted immediate- 
ly by Lazarus Spengler, secretary to the city council in Nuremberg, who 
maintained that his was an imperial city and that its rulers were directly 
subject to the emperor, to whom they had sworn allegiance and from whom 
their power was derived. He implied that the situation of the other estates was 
similar.2 2 Although the inferior magistrates were rulers to their subjects, vis d 
vis the emperor they were no more than private persons: "For in this case 
Nuremberg is... no longer a ruler, but just like another individual private 
person and an immediate subject of the emperor."23 The theologian Brenz 
elaborated upon Spengler's essentially medieval and hierarchical image of the 
empire by describing the Holy Roman Empire as having been established by 
God in three estates, the emperor being the highest, the princes the middle, 
and the subjects the lowest. The princes, occupying an intermediate position, 
were thus sometimes rulers (to their subjects) but must always behave as 
obedient subjects to the emperor.24 
Yet there was conflict even among the theologians within the city over 
this constitutional question. Andreas Osiander, a Nuremberg theologian who 
favored the entry of his city into the Protestant League, agreed with Philip of 
Hesse's image of the empire as a limited monarchy. The emperor had gained 
his authority, he claimed, by election, and his accession to the throne had 
depended upon the acceptance of certain conditions.25 The German estates 
21 Letter from Philip of Hesse to Margrave George of Brandenburg-Ansbach (De- 
cember 21, 1529), in Scheible, pp. 44-46. See also Philip of Hesse to Luther (October 21, 
1530), WA Briefe, V, 653-54. 
22Spengler, "Gutachten" (before November 15, 1529), in Scheible, p. 36. 
2"3Ibid. Translation mine. 
24 Brenz to Margrave George of Brandenburg-Ansbach (November 27, 1529), in 
Scheible, pp. 40-41. 
25"Ein Theologischer Rathschlag von Nurnberg: Dass nicht alle, sondern nur die 
ordentliche Gewalt von Gott. Unnd dass derowegen die Untere Obrigkeit im Reich wol 
befugt, wider die unordentliche Gewalt dess Obern, in GlaubensSachen, ihre Underthanen 
zu schutzen," in Hortleder, II, 85. Hortleder dates this tract as 1531 and is unsure if it 
was written by Osiander, but Ludwig Cardauns, Die Lehre vom Widerstandsrecht des 
Volkes gegen die rechtmdssige Obrigkeit im Lutherthum und im Calvinismus des 16. 
Jahrhunderts (Bonn: Emil Eisele, 1903), p. 15, attributes it to Osiander. 
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thus had no obligation to obey him, except insofar as he strictly fulfilled 
those requirements of his rule: "A king who is elected... upon specific 
conditions remains an authority only so long as he keeps to those conditions 
and the articles of the oath which he has sworn."26 Moreover, the inferior 
magistrates within Germany were collectively of equal status to the emperor 
and even at times superior to him since they had the power to create the 
emperor and, by implication and historical precedent, to depose him as well. 
Thus when the emperor departed from his obligation to look after the welfare 
of Germany, the inferior magistrates were entirely justified in protecting their 
subjects against him.27 
Although Philip of Hesse failed to persuade Nuremberg to adhere to the 
League of Schmalkalden, the public airing of juridical arguments for resistance 
proved to be of great significance. Despite the fact that Luther and Melanch- 
thon maintained their formal opposition to resistance throughout most of 
1530 (although there is evidence that Melanchthon already envisaged the 
German electors in an ephoral role in his 1530 Commentary on Aristotle's 
Politics),2 8the rest of the theologians at Wittenberg do not seem to have 
concurred with their rejection of legal arguments. For example, an anonymous 
"theological opinion" presumed to have been written there in 153029 em- 
braced the constitutional arguments described above. Although admitting that 
the ordinary duty of a Christian was passive disobedience, that is, to disobey 
but accept punishment, the authors hypothesized that perhaps the princes in 
the German empire could actively resist the emperor when he violated the 
conditions upon which he had been elected: 
Thus, however, if the sovereign, who is obligated by his office and 
honor to seek the common good of his subjects and who was elected for 
that purpose, intends to take upon himself other matters which are 
either contrary to his charge or which do not concern it nor belong to 
him, but which are rather private matters or even ones otherwise disad- 
vantageous and harmful to the common good and the empire, and thus 
misuses his power, which is not hereditary but to which he is elected, 
and under condition and oath obligated, then in such a case we could 
and would wish not to burden and thereby imprison the consciences of 
26Ibid. Translation mine. 
27Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
2 8 "There is, therefore, another kind of kingdom, a supreme rule, but one qualified 
by an established law. Certain nations have supplemented their kings with guardians, who 
have the right of reproving the kings. Just as the Lacedaemonians added ephors, in 
Germany there are electors; in France there are certain princes of the parlement, who act 
as if they were the ephors of the kings," Melanchthon, Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae 
supersunt omnia, ed. Karl G. Bretschneider and Heinrich E. Bindseil (28 vols.; vols. 
I-XXVIII of Corpus Reformatorum; Halle: C. A. Schwetschke and Son, 1834-1860), XVI, 
440. Translation mine. 
2 9 "Ein Theologisches Bedencken," in Hortleder, II, 68. Scheible (p. 77) dates this 
opinion as 1530. 
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the lords and persons in authority who are also responsible for watching 
over the whole German nation, and are to be pillars of the empire, 
about whether they, for their poor subjects and relations, [should] not 
permit all unjust undertakings to their elected superior and protect 
themselves against it.30 
The theologians were clearly worried that the politicians under their spiritual 
care were going ahead with the intended league; and their concern for these 
men's souls pressed them, however tentatively, to re-examine the nature of the 
German constitution. Their conclusions seem close to those of Philip of Hesse. 
If the princes under German law were "pillars of the empire," co-rulers with 
its head, and shared his responsibility to look after the welfare of the whole, 
then they were merely acting as executors of the German constitution in 
protecting their subjects against him, and not in their own interest. 
Thus some of the theologians in Wittenberg had, it seems, been con- 
vinced by the legal arguments put forth by the Saxon jurists and by politi- 
cians such as Philip of Hesse, indicating that the chinks in the Wittenberg 
"front" were in fact broader than the natural law theory of Bugenhagen might 
suggest. The theologians' desire to remain anonymous may be attributed to 
the fact that Luther was not himself convinced, yet it was ultimately argu- 
ments such as these which overcame his opposition to the proposed league of 
Protestant princes. In any case, the existence of this opinion clearly demon- 
strates that the ultimate confrontation at Torgau was not simply a debate 
between the Saxon jurists and a unified group of theologians. 
When the elector summoned both his lawyers and parson/professors to 
dispute the justifiability of resistance in the darkening political atmosphere 
after the failure of the diet at Augsburg to resolve the religious "question," it 
was the jurists who did elaborate the constitutional and legal arguments in 
favor of Saxon membership in the proposed league. The emperor had been 
elected upon specific conditions, they insisted, and thus had an obligation to 
rule in conjunction with the estates. If he violated the laws of the empire, as 
he had done by proceeding against the Protestants when their appeal to a 
council was still pending, all their obligations to him were erased.31 Relying 
heavily upon Roman and canon law, the lawyers asserted that the princes and 
estates might resist the emperor in situations similar to those in which a 
private individual could lawfully disobey a judge and resist the execution of 
his sentence: when he made a ruling on a matter not within his jurisdiction; 
when he passed a sentence involving clear and irreparable injustice; and when the 
procedures for appeal were not respected. Analogously, the emperor had 
attempted at Speyer and Augsburg to execute his judgment in matters of 
religion, which did not fall within his jurisdiction; his decision was, in the 
Protestants' judgment, clearly wrong and involved irreparable damage in the 
possible loss of souls; and procedural law had been violated when the emperor 
3 Ibid. Translation mine. 
31 Gutachten der kursachsischen Juristen, in Scheible, pp. 63-66. 
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continued to execute his judgment while the appeals were still pending.3 2 These 
were the arguments, seemingly, which led to Luther's sudden, if reluctant, 
change of heart at Torgau. 
At this point I would like to assess the contribution of these early 
Lutheran arguments for a constitutionally-based resistance toward the develop- 
ment of a "mature" resistance theory. Bucer, Philip of Hesse, the Saxon 
jurists, and many of the Wittenberg theologians all agreed that the circum- 
stances had arrived under which the emperor might justly be resisted. Many of 
them were not very precise, however, in defining the standards by which they 
had reached this conclusion. The Nuremberg theologian spoke vaguely of the 
emperor's "misuse" of the power of his office; others, such as the anonymous 
theologians, referred to the emperor's obligation to look out for the "common 
good" and not to invade the sphere of "private," presumably religious, affairs. 
Philip of Hesse was more specific about the standards for resistance as he 
invoked the legal conditions upon which the emperor's election was based: by 
violating the provisions of his electoral oath, Charles had thereby neglected his 
more general obligation to maintain the laws as well. This notion was very 
similar to medieval contractual notions and shared their vagueness. The Saxon 
jurists were the most specific in citing the crimes for which Charles was to be 
indicted; yet one nonetheless receives the impression that most of these 
writers had already decided that resistance to the emperor was justified and 
that they were not very concerned with delineating the precise moment at 
which he had overstepped the bounds of his authority. 
In approaching question number three the Lutherans had by the early 
1530s developed rather fully what was to become the distinctive Protestant 
answer: the groups included under the term "inferior magistrates," because of 
their continuing constitutional obligation to protect their subjects, were the 
appropriate agents of resistance. Such an answer was uniquely suited to the 
German situation since it provided a justification for action by the parties 
who were politically relevant there without inviting democratic implications. 
Because of their special position resistance by the inferior magistrates was 
justifiable "Widerstand" while any uprising by these magistrates' own subjects 
against them was termed "Aufruhr" and heartily condemned. Private persons 
had never been given the sword, nor were they assigned any special place in 
the princes' interpretation of the German constitution. Nonetheless, by the 
implication, sometimes stated outright, that obligation depended upon the 
consent of the party bound,33 a dangerous inconsistency was introduced. On 
the terms of the constitutional argument alone there was no guarantee that 
similar grounds might not be used by all subjects against their rulers. Thus the 
32 Ibid. 
3 3The Nuremberg theologian insisted that the princes were bound to obey the 
emperor only because they had entered into a semi-contractual arrangement with him 
("Ein Theologischer Rathschlag. . . " in Hortleder, 11, 84-85). 
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legal arguments demanded supplementation by theological injunctions against 
action by individuals or groups of subjects if they were to provide the delicate 
balance required, justifying the resistance envisaged and yet reaffirming the 
duty of obedience by private persons. 
The necessity of dealing with question four, the means of resistance, was 
blithely ignored by most Lutheran resistance writers during this period. This 
fact was pointed out by their opponents, who insisted that no more than 
orderly and institutional deposition procedures were called for under the 
German constitution. Those who wrote in favor of resistance, on the other 
hand, called simply for whatever measures were necessary, a position which 
might be interpreted as a regression to the early medieval image of resistance 
as "abandonment."34 It was only later, in the days immediately preceding 
and during the Schmalkaldic War, that Lutheran theorists turned their atten- 
tion to some of the problems involved in this question.35 
As for question five, it is clear that the various writers dealing with the 
question of resistance, and even those who agreed in supporting it, had differ- 
ing images of the patterns of authority in Germany. The constitutional ideas 
which collided included notions of the empire as a confederation, as a limited 
monarchy, as an absolute monarchy, and as an aristocracy. It is very hard to 
say which of these was an accurate description of the contemporary situation 
and which represented a radical deviation from the status quo, for the fact is 
that the empire was in a period of flux. In a sense Charles' desire for a 
universal monarchy was the most revolutionary, and his attempts to assert 
power within Germany were opposed by authorities with the weight of tradi- 
tion on their side. The princes' response was, on the one hand, to emphasize 
medieval limitations upon the German monarchy and to concretize such limits 
by placing specific conditions upon the emperor's election. In addition to 
asserting such limits, however, the princes tried to provide for a continuing 
role by the estates in the administration of the empire. During the late fif- 
teenth and early sixteenth centuries repeated attempts to institutionalize this 
participation were made, the establishment of the Imperial Cameral Tribunal 
in 1495 and of the Imperial Governing Council in 1500 being examples. If 
these institutions had succeeded in asserting their own authority over the 
government of the empire, Germany would have been transformed into an 
aristocracy. What the ineffectiveness of these institutions and the emperor's 
failure to assert his own will made clear, however, was that the German 
34 See Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, pp. 86ff. 
35For example, Justus Menius, Von der Nothwehr Unterricht: Nitzlichen zu lesen 
(Wittenberg, 1547), in Hortleder, II, 152-171 and Basilius Monnerus, Von der Defension 
und Gegenwehr, ob man sich wider der Obrigkeit unrechte Gewalt wehren, und Gewalt 
mit Gewalt jure vertreiben m6ge? (1547), in Hortleder, II, 171-193. Bekenntnis Unter- 
richt und Vermanung der Pfarrhern und Prediger der Christlichen Kirchen zu Magdeburgk 
(Magdeburg: Michael Lotther, April 13, 1550). 
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princes were increasingly subject to no authority but their own. At the very 
time, ironically, when the theoretical bases were being laid for a constitu- 
tional, limited monarchy, the loose confederation which actually existed was 
rapidly disappearing. In hindsight the replacement of the medieval structure 
by multiple, independent states may seem to have been inevitable, but its fate 
still seemed to lie in the balance for writers in the sixteenth century. And it 
was in fact the question with which they were then wrestling, that of resist- 
ance on behalf of religion, on which the unity of the empire ultimately 
foundered. 
Conclusion 
Soon after the Torgau Disputation an anonymous jurist published an 
opinion which provides a good compendium of the mix of natural law and 
juridical arguments which had brought the Protestants to such a momentous 
juncture and which ultimately blended together to produce the elaborate and 
sophisticated Lutheran statements of the 1540s, and the famous Magdeburg 
Confession of 1550.36 In approaching each of the questions involved in the 
delineation of a resistance theory, this author combined a whole battery of 
points taken both from the constitutionalists' position and also from the 
theological position of writers such as Bugenhagen. For example, while con- 
cerned with refuting Scriptural arguments against resistance and adducing 
evidence from natural law, the writer also based his justification of resistance 
upon the nature of the emperor's office as an elective and limited, rather than 
absolute, monarchy.3 7 In approaching the question of standards for determin- 
ing when resistance became justified, he referred both to the emperor's duty 
to abide by the conditions of his election, such as his responsibility to main- 
tain the peace, and to his violation of the boundaries between the jurisdiction 
of God and that of man.38 The Saxon jurists' interpretations of the canon 
law strictures about action which was ultra vires, or taken while an appeal was 
pending, or which involved irreparable injury were included in this hybrid 
opinion, as was a refutation of the counter-argument hat the emperor was to be 
exempted from such accountability. The emperor, in the judgment of this 
author, was to be excluded neither from the accountability of magistrates nor 
from the prohibition against the taking of property by force nor from the 
36 "Ein nicht ungeschichter Juristischer Rahtschlag: Das man in der GlaubensSache, 
sonderlich weil appelliert an ein Concilium, die Defension wider den Keyser brauchen: 
Auch auff was Weise, und wer im Reich Teutscher Nation widerstehen moge?", in Hort- 
leder, II, 79-82. 
3"Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
38Ibid., pp. 78, 80-81. 
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imposition of the ban itself, should he act in violation of the law.3 9 
Both divine and constitutional law were also invoked to support the 
principle that resistance was forbidden to private citizens and thus to quiet 
fears that the princes' subjects would make use of these arguments to justify 
rebellion against them as well. God had not given the sword to private individ- 
uals but only to magistrates.40 Moreover, the princes' positions were hered- 
itary and did not depend upon election; thus the legal-constitutional argu- 
ments could not be redirected with revolutionary consequences.4 Individuals 
who did not have public office must obey the authorities within their state 
and join battle against the emperor only upon the command of their local 
superiors. 
Hence what was to become the "classic" Lutheran doctrine of resistance 
carefully blended both natural and positive law traditions although as it was 
refined during the 1530s and 1540s, natural law arguments came increasingly 
to the fore. The point in which I am most interested, however, from my 
choice of the period before 1530 is that so many of these arguments had 
appeared so early, preceding, as I have repeatedly emphasized, Luther's own 
development and, perhaps even more important, that of Calvinist writers as 
well. Bucer's and Melanchthon's versions of the ephoral doctrine were avail- 
able, both in Latin, to Calvin long before the famous passage about the 
possibility of resistance by ephoral magistrates appeared in the 1536 version 
of the Institutes, and both men are known to have been an influence, as close 
personal friends and/or as correspondents, upon Calvin.42 The early German 
writings were available to other French Calvinists as well. 
The Huguenots, however, wrote in a qualitatively different context, that 
of a fledgling nation-state rather than of the multi-national imperial structure 
from which the Lutheran princes were attempting to secede. In terms of my 
five-question theoretical structure, therefore, the French Calvinists were forced 
to deal head on with question number five as they revived the element of 
popular sovereignty which had been present in some medieval theories and 
sought, through "popular" representatives, to participate in and to control the 
political structure of France. Thus we may with justice, I think, call these 
39Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
4?Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
4 1 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
42Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, IV, xx, 31. For Calvin's many debts 
to Bucer, see Franqois Wendel, Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious 
Thought, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Collins, 1963), pp. 76, 79, 138ff.; Hans Baron, 
"Calvinist Republicanism and its Historical Roots," Church History, VIII (1939), 36ff.; 
Wilhelm Pauck, The Heritage of the Reformation (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), 
pp. 85-99. For his relationship to Melanchthon and the latter's influence upon him, see 
Wendel, pp. 62-63, 134-135, and Josef Bohatec, Calvins Lehre von Staat und Kirche 
(Breslau: Marcus, 1937), pp. 82-84. 
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later theories genuinely theories of revolution while the Lutherans had delin- 
eated no more than a notion of limited resistance. Such an image of the 
evolution of modern resistance theory, however, places the Lutherans in a key 
position, striding between two worlds, two historical periods, two state 
systems, and their work forms a link between medieval and modern theories 
of resistance which it is indispensable to understand and recognize. 
